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Abstract: During the last two decades, critical enquiry into the nature of race has begun to enter the philosophical main-
stream. The same period has also witnessed the emergence of an increasingly visible discourse about the nature of infor-
mation within a diverse range of popular and academic settings. What is yet to emerge, however, is engagement at the 
interface of the two disciplines – critical race theory and the philosophy of information. In this paper, I shall attempt to con-
tribute towards the emergence of such a field of enquiry by using a reflexive hermeneutic (or interpretative) approach to 
analyze the concept of race from an information-theoretical perspective, while reflexively analyzing the concept of informa-
tion from a critical race-theoretical perspective. In order to facilitate a more concrete enquiry, the concept of information 
formulated by cyberneticist Gregory Bateson and the concept of race formulated by philosopher Charles W Mills will be 
placed at the centre of analysis. Crucially, both concepts can be shown to have a connection to the critical philosophy of 
Immanuel Kant, thereby motivating their selection as topics of examination on critical reflexive hermeneutic grounds. 
Keywords: Critical Race Theory, Philosophy of Information, Information Theory, Systems Theory, Race, Racism, Gregory 
Bateson, Charles W Mills, Immanuel Kant 
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According to the cyberneticist Gregory Bateson, information, or rather the elementary unit of 
information is “a difference that makes a difference” (1972, 459). Crucially, on this view, a differ-
ence is “not a thing or an event”; rather, it is an “abstract matter”, and in the world of communica-
tion and organisation this “abstract matter”, whose essence can be shown to lie in form and pat-
tern, can bring about “effects” (p.458). To the extent that race constitutes a difference – perhaps 
the difference – that makes a difference in the world in terms of its impact on political, economic, 
cultural and other social concerns, it can be analysed in informational terms; however, it is what 
Floridi (2002, 142) refers to as the “information turn in philosophy” which indicates that such an 
analysis should be carried out1. The emergence of a global information society has placed informa-
tion at the centre of contemporary intellectual discourse, motivating application of the concept in a 
variety of areas. It is precisely because of this “information turn” that critical2
This paper aims at contributing towards critical enquiry into the nature of information using a re-
flexive hermeneutic approach to explore the differences made by – or “effects” that result from – 
the interaction of race and information, both of which make reference to the concept of difference. 
First, brief overviews of recent developments within information studies and race studies are pre-
sented which indicate that although critical enquiries have been undertaken in both disciplines, 
reflexive engagement at the intersection of these disciplines has yet to take place. A reflexive her-
meneutic approach to race and information which involves analyzing the concept of race from an 
information-theoretical perspective while reflexively analyzing the concept of information from a 
race-theoretical perspective, resulting in a hermeneutic (or interpretative) spiral, is then briefly out-
lined. This approach is then used to subject the concept of race, principally the systemic formula-
tion of this concept due to the philosopher Charles W. Mills, and the concept of information, princi-
pally the Kant-inspired formulation due to Bateson, to critical enquiry. Finally, some brief conclu-
sions and proposals for future work are presented.  
 enquiry into the nature 
of information becomes important, perhaps even necessary. 
                                                     
1 Floridi holds that “the development of human society has now reached a stage in which issues concerning the crea-
tion, dynamics, management, and utilisation of information and computational resources are absolutely vital” (2002, 127). 
2 The term ‘critical’ should here be understood as having a meaning similar to the use of this term in critical theory, viz. 
as concerned with issues of exploitation, oppression, injustice, domination, subjugation, control, asymmetrical power-
relations etc. 
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It is important to keep in mind that this work is both preliminary and exploratory in nature, its aim 
being to make a modest yet significant contribution to an ongoing and expanding project concerned 
with investigating issues at the intersection of critical race theory, computing, information theory, 
systems theory and cybernetics. However, before proceeding, it is important to consider how the 
theoretical underpinning and reflexive hermeneutic approach presented herein relates to the analy-
sis of other phenomena such as gender discrimination, homophobia and anti-Semitism. 
Some theorists, such as Omi and Winant, argue that race, class, gender (and sexual orienta-
tion) constitute interlocking “regions of hegemony” with none of them constituting a privileged site 
of enunciation (1994, 68). Others have proposed similar schemes based on the idea of ‘axes’ or 
‘dimensions’ of oppression within the context of modernity3. However, the claim that there are 
symmetries or analogies between race, class, gender and sexual orientation vis-à-vis oppression – 
which is advanced largely by white critical race theorists working in the discipline of ‘whiteness’ 
studies – has been challenged by a number of non-white researchers4
Consistent with this position, Mills (2003) maintains that race, not class, constitutes the ‘primary 
contradiction’ and that it trumps gender in this regard. Mills advances this position while affording 
due recognition to the continued existence of these other forms of oppression and acknowledging 
that patriarchy constitutes a historically-earlier form of oppression (Mills and Pateman 2007). Post-
colonial – or rather, decolonial – scholars such as Walter Mignolo, Ramón Grosfoguel and others 
go further to argue that the contemporary world system, which they refer to as a “colonial matrix of 
power”, is both religiously- and racially-grounding relative to class, gender and sexual orientation.  
. According to Johar Schuel-
ler, “there is no parallel in sexual oppression to the racial oppression that legitimized the enslave-
ment of Africans in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (although the latter certainly included 
elements of sexual oppression as well); racial difference is marked on the body with a visibility not 
apparent in a person’s different sexual practices, such as sadomasochism versus ‘vanilla’. The 
analogical relationships [between race, class, gender and sexual orientation], however, function to 
suppress the specific differences introduced by race. The seeming equivalence of the analogy and 
the horizontal seriality suggested by the commas often used by gender [and whiteness] theorists to 
include concerns of race and class in routinely used phrases such as “race, class, and gender” 
belie a hierarchy of ontologies that privilege whiteness” (2005, 71). 
Building on the position of Johar Schueller, Mills, Mignolo, Grosfoguel and other non-white de-
colonial scholars, the author of this paper takes the view that race is grounding relative to other 
considerations such as class, gender and sexual orientation and that issues of gender discrimina-
tion, homophobia and anti-Semitism should be subjected to critical analysis from this perspective. 
1. Critical Information Theory 
Scientific and philosophical enquiry into the nature of information has been going on for at least 
a century, its foundations being laid by the pioneering work of logicians and mathematicians such 
as Frege and Turing, and communications engineers, cyberneticists and systems theorists such as 
Shannon, Weaver, Wiener and Bateson among others5
                                                     
3 It is interesting to note how theorists working in disciplines such as gender studies, postcolonial studies and critical 
theory tend to conceptualize systems of power and oppression in spatial and/or mathematical terms, e.g. ‘regions’, ‘axes’, 
‘dimensions’, ‘vectors’ (Judith Butler) and ‘matrices’ (Walter Mignolo etc). To the extent that information can be conceived in 
mathematical terms (at least following Shannon), it might be argued that all such articulations are fundamentally informa-
tional in nature. 
. It is important to appreciate at the very 
outset that there is no consensus as to the meaning of the term ‘information’: according to Rocchi 
4 Johar Schueller maintains that “it has become almost a given that works in gender and sexuality studies [authored by 
white feminist theorists] acknowledge multiple axes of oppression or invoke the mantra of race, class, gender, and sexuality” 
(2005, 64). She goes on to describe what is, in her view, “the dominant paradigm for the imperialist incorporation of women 
of color in contemporary gender and sexuality studies: incorporation by analogy. This strategy denies primacy to the voices 
of the colonized that have proclaimed the pre-eminence of the racial difference” (2005, 65, emphasis added). Significantly, 
Schueller points to the “epistemological function of analogy” and “the political role of analogy as epistemology” (2005, 67) 
and argues for the necessity of enquiring as to “who is doing the analogizing and to what purpose”. On her view, “the analo-
gizing move within white feminist theory ... may constitute a neo-colonial movement more dangerous than the earlier ab-
sence of race and, thus, may need close scrutiny”. (2005, 68) This is because “racial analogy in white femi-
nist/gender/sexuality studies functions as a colonial fetish that enables the (white) theorist to displace the potentially disrup-
tive contradictions of racial difference onto a safer and more palatable notion of similarity, thus offering theory that can be 
easily assimilated within the politics of liberal multiculturalism” (2005, 72). On a related note, and following Hesse (2011), it 
might be argued that conceptualising race in biological terms and in a European context has resulted in anti-Semitism being 
placed in the analytical foreground of race discourse while non-European – that is, colonial – formations of race are moved 
into the background. 
5 Ramage (2011) provides an interesting overview of the various competing Western perspectives on information within 
the history of cybernetics. For detailed historical accounts of the development of information and cybernetics in US and 
Soviet contexts, readers are referred to works by Heims (1993) and Gerovitch (2002) respectively. 
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(2011), more than twenty-five different theories of information can be identified in the period from 
1948 to 2009. These include the mathematical – which for many researchers, means purely quanti-
tative and syntactic – theory of information (often abbreviated to MTC, mathematical theory of 
communication) due to Shannon and Weaver (1949)6
However, philosophy of information (PI) as a distinct discipline in its own right owes its concep-
tion to the philosopher Luciano Floridi who for the last decade, and in an ever-expanding series of 
works, has attempted to clarify the different senses of this term, delineate its boundaries and iden-
tify its problematic concerns (Floridi 2002; 2003; 2004a; 2004b; 2009; 2010a; 2010b). According to 
Floridi, “PI deals with three types of domain: topics (facts, data, problems, phenomena, observa-
tions, and the like); methods (techniques, approaches, and so on); and theories (hypotheses, ex-
planations, and so forth)” (2002, 126), and may be defined as follows: “The philosophy of informa-
tion (PI) is the philosophical field concerned with (a) the critical investigation of the conceptual na-
ture and basic principles of information, including its dynamics, utilisation, and sciences, and (b) the 
elaboration and application of information-theoretic and computational methodologies to philoso-
phical problems” (2002, 137). 
; the ecological theory of information due to 
Bateson (1972); and the autopoietic theory of information due to Maturana and Varela (1980). Re-
cently, a number of more explicitly philosophical conceptualisations of information have begun to 
appear including the semantic theory of information due to Floridi (2004a), and what profess to be 
proto-scientific theories of information as formulated by Capurro and Hjørland (2003), Capurro 
(2009) and Hofkirchner (2009; 2011a; 2011b). 
Floridi maintains that “PI is not only a new field but provides an innovative methodology as well. 
Research into the conceptual nature of information and its dynamics and utilisation is carried on 
from the vantage point represented by the methodologies and theories offered by ICS [or Informa-
tion and Computational Sciences] and ICT. This perspective affects other philosophical topics as 
well. Information-theoretic and computational methods, concepts, tools, and techniques have al-
ready been developed and applied in many philosophical areas” (2002, 139). It is precisely for this 
reason that it is important, perhaps even necessary, to consider whether PI, or some other philoso-
phy of information, might legitimately be applied to critical race theoretical enquiry from a herme-
neutic perspective7. For example, according to Floridi, “PI provides critical investigations that are 
not to be confused with a quantitative theory of data communication (information theory). On the 
whole, its task is to develop not a unified theory of information but rather an integrated family of 
theories that analyse, evaluate, and explain the various principles and concepts of information, 
their dynamics and utilisation” (2002, 137, emphasis added). Significantly, he maintains that “in 
philosophy ... virtually any issue can be rephrased in informational terms” (2002, 139); however, 
Floridi also insists that “although many philosophical issues seem to benefit greatly from an infor-
mational analysis, in PI information theory provides a literal foundation, not just a metaphorical 
superstructure. PI presupposes that a problem or an explanation can be legitimately and genuinely 
reduced to an informational problem or explanation” (2002, 140, emphases added). Given the re-
flexive hermeneutic approach to considering issues at the intersection of race and information ar-
gued for herein, it is questionable to what extent PI can – or should – be considered capable of 
providing a foundation for critical enquiry into information8
                                                     
6 Floridi maintains that “since MTC is a theory of information without meaning, and information minus meaning = data, 
mathematical theory of data communication is a far more appropriate description than information theory” (2004a, 52), a 
position that derives support from Weaver’s insistence that “MTC deals with the carriers of information, symbols and signals, 
not with information itself” (Weaver 1949 cited in Floridi 2004a, 52). Floridi further states that “the [MTC] approaches infor-
mation as a physical phenomenon. Its central question is whether and how much uninterpreted data can be encoded and 
transmitted efficiently by means of a given alphabet and through a given channel. MTC is not interested in the meaning, 
aboutness, relevance, usefulness, or interpretation of information, but only in the level of detail and frequency in the uninter-
preted data, being these symbols, signals or messages” (2004a, 53). Similarly, Capurro maintains that the MTC “does not 
deal with communication as transmission of meaning or with information as the meaning of a message. It is a theory of the 
codification and transmission of messages” (2009, 131). Nonetheless, this view has not gone uncontested. For example, 
Chapman has argued that the concept of information in MTC can, in fact, be shown to be semantic (or meaningful) by draw-
ing on parallels between insights into the layered architectures used by communications engineers and semiotic concepts of 
meaning. However, as Chapman concedes, this is only possible by making use of “a definition of meaning based on a 
rather mechanistic interpretation of the meaning of semiotic signs” (2011, 49), and additionally, it might be argued, on the 
basis of a conflation of mind with brain, and anthropomorphism with respect to encoding operations in the layered architec-
ture, viz. signals being “taken to mean” something (but by whom?) 
. 
7 This position finds additional support in Floridi’s claim that “informational and computational concepts, methods, tech-
niques, and theories had become powerful metaphors acting as ‘hermeneutic devices’ through which to interpret the world. 
They had established a metadisciplinary, unified language that had become common currency in all academic subjects, 
including philosophy” (2002, 129). 
8 Floridi maintains that “research into the conceptual nature of information and its dynamics and utilisation is carried on 
from the vantage point represented by the methodologies and theories offered by ICS and ICT This perspective affects 
other philosophical topics as well. Information-theoretic and computational methods, concepts, tools, and techniques have 
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In contrast to Floridi’s proposal for an integrated family of information theories, Hofkirchner 
(2009; 2011a; 2011b) proposes a Unified Theory of Information (UTI) grounded in an emergent 
materialism9 that allegedly goes some way toward resolving problems resulting from the lack of 
reflexivity associated with PI. This is done by appealing to a framework that is structuralist, hierar-
chical and dialectical which, it is claimed, provides the scientific means by which to integrate vari-
ous domains of human existence. According to Hofkirchner, “it is malfunctions in the sociosphere, 
ecosphere and technosphere that continue to aggravate the global challenges. And it is information 
that turns out the only remedy. It is information that is required to steer society. It is information that 
is required to reorganise humanity onto a higher level of organisation ... Information is the conditio 
sine qua non for the further existence and development of humanity” (2009, 359, emphases 
added). It is important to appreciate that in conceiving (information) science in dialectical terms, a 
commitment to critical theory and some form of Marxist and/or Hegelian metaphysics is implied10
Recent works by Lash (2002), from a social-science perspective, and the edited collection by 
Leckie et al. (2010) in the field of library and information science, provide further evidence of en-
gagement at the interface of critical theory and information studies. However, perhaps the most 
important since most overtly ideological
. 
11 – perhaps even polemical – of such works from the per-
spective of this study is an article by Christian Fuchs entitled “Towards a critical theory of informa-
tion” (Fuchs 2009) which purports to address issues of race, gender and class in the context of a 
neo-Marxist dialectical framework12. Although Fuchs’ critical theory of information is both interest-
ing and relatively well-developed, it is crucial to appreciate that it assumes the legitimacy of a 
class-based historically-materialist analysis of power relations, domination and oppression in which 
economic concerns are considered basic while other concerns, such as those relating to gender 
and race, are taken to be superstructural in the sense of non-foundational. This approach contrasts 
strongly with other historically-materialist interpretations of socio-political reality focusing on asym-
metric power relations such as the contractual framework proposed by Mills and Pateman (2007) in 
which race, racism and processes of racialization are viewed as grounding systemic concerns 
against which issues relating to gender and class must be addressed. To the extent that existing 
critical information theory is grounded in critical theory, and to the extent that the latter is funda-
mentally Marxist/class-based in orientation, drawing heavily on the works of thinkers in the Frank-
furt school such as Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, it appears to offer little in the way of re-
sources for critical race theoretical enquiry into the nature of information13
Consistent with the reflexive hermeneutic approach to analysis presented herein, and having 
briefly examined information theory from a critical perspective, it is necessary to shift the focus of 
enquiry to consideration of race theory from a critical perspective. 
. 
                                                                                                                                                                
already been developed and applied in many philosophical areas” (2002,139). However, this position fails to appreciate the 
need for considering a reflexive move from philosophical topics – including those which are largely ‘invisible’ to the Western 
philosophical canon such as critical race theory – and to the philosophy of information. 
9 It is interesting to note in this regard that Floridi’s General Definition of Information (GDI) (2004a) is metaphysically ag-
nostic in that it does not require a commitment to materialism or realism. This is significant since as Van Cleve (1990), 
Griffin (1998) and others have argued, contrary to Hofkirchner’s assertions, the explanatory status of emergent materialism 
is not unproblematic. In particular, the “hard problem” of consciousness (Chalmers 1996), viz. how ontological-subjectivity 
(experiential first-personhood) can emerge from an ontologically-objective (third-person, non-experiential) substrate looms 
large, proposed dialectical resolutions of this problem involving the (re-)interpretation of mind as an emergent property or 
event “of a different materiality” (Hofkirchner 2009, 363) notwithstanding. 
10 Evidence supporting this assertion is provided by explicit references to Marx and Hegel in Hofkirchner (2009). This is 
significant from a critical race theoretical perspective since as Eze (1997), Bernasconi (2003b), Tibebu (2011) and others 
have shown, Hegel’s philosophy of history is both Eurocentric and racist. It remains to be determined to what extent, if at all, 
Hegel’s historical racism impacts on his dialectic. 
11 Given Fuchs’ commitment to a Marxist interpretation of the term ‘ideology’ and his belief that some variant of neo-
Marxism provides the necessary and sufficient foundations for a scientific (meaning ‘true’) conception of reality, this classifi-
cation would probably be rejected by him. However, to the extent that the metaphysical status of neo-Marxist accounts of 
reality remains contestable, such criticism begs the question. 
12 Unfortunately, limitations of space preclude the possibility of presenting a more detailed critical race theoretical analy-
sis of Lash’s critique of information and Fuchs’ critical theory of information at this time. A preliminary attempt at such a 
critique was presented at the 4th ICTs and Society Conference held at Uppsala University, 2-4 May 2012 (Ali 2012). 
13 In this connection, it is important to note that non-European scholars working in the field of postcolonial – more pre-
cisely, decolonial – studies such as Walter Mignolo (2010) have similarly questioned the relevance of Frankfurt school 
thinking for critical projects concerned with emancipating (i.e. decolonising) epistemology. On their view, Marxist/Hegelian 
dialectic and Frankfurt school discourse on the issue of modernity are both fundamentally Eurocentric in orientation, mask-
ing the hegemonic operation of a “dark underside”, viz. coloniality or the “colonial matrix of power”. 
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2. Critical Race Theory 
Although scholarly enquiry into the nature of race14 has been going on within the Western tradi-
tion for the last few centuries, it is only relatively recently that critical discourse about race and ra-
cism has surfaced within the mainstream of academic philosophy15. Following the pioneering lead 
of Eze (1997), a number of studies have appeared during the last two decades subjecting the 
works of major Enlightenment figures such as Descartes, Hobbes, Hume, Locke, Rousseau, Kant 
and Hegel, and post-Enlightenment figures such as Nietzsche and Heidegger, to detailed scrutiny. 
Examples of such works include collections edited by Bernasconi (2001a), Boxill (2001), Ward and 
Lott (2002), Bernasconi and Cook (2003), Levine and Pataki (2004), Valls (2005), and the four-
volume collection edited by Taylor (2011). Studies from a critical theory perspective have also ap-
peared including the edited collection by Harris (1999) and the sociologically-informed critical-
realist investigation of race and racism by Carter (2000). More recently, a number of what might be 
designated as critical race-theoretical enquiries into race have been conducted by philosophers 
including Outlaw (1996), Mills (1997; 1998; 2003) and Taylor (2004)16
Despite these positive developments, there has been little in the way of philosophical enquiry 
into race from the perspective of information and systems theory. Where race is engaged with from 
an informational perspective, such enquiry tends to be more sociologically rather than philosophi-
cally informed, and generally focuses on the following issues: (i) differential access to ICTs and the 
so-called “Digital Divide”
. While it is true that the ma-
jority of such investigations are framed in terms of the Anglo-American analytic tradition within phi-
losophy, there have been some notable exceptions: for example, the collections edited by Bernas-
coni (2001a) and Bernasconi and Cook (2003) examine race and racism within the continental 
tradition of philosophy, focusing on phenomenological and hermeneutic concerns as well as the 
works of major philosophers identified with this tradition (e.g. Nietzsche, Heidegger and Sartre). 
With regard to scholarly output in academic journals and conference proceedings, the situation is 
even more promising, with an increasingly large body of work addressing race from a number of 
perspectives being generated by philosophers working within a range of traditions, including those 
that are critically-informed. 
17; (ii) representation of and power relations between different ethnic and 
racial groups within information spaces such as social networks and virtual worlds18; (iii) the har-
nessing of digital technologies for the promotion of white nationalist/supremacist agendas19; and 
(iv) non-white – more specifically, non-white African and African-American – contributions to and 
appropriations of cybernetics and systems theory20. What remains largely, if not entirely, unex-
plored is the possible contribution that information theory, systems theory and cybernetics can 
make to an understanding of race, racism and processes of racialization21. Perhaps the closest 
there is to something along these lines is Fuller, Jr.’s systems-theoretical formulation which defines 
race (and racism) in the following self-referential (or circular) terms22
                                                     
14 Race is a concept that is notoriously hard to define and there is perhaps even less consensus as to its meaning than 
there is in the case of information. Banton defines a race as “a group or category of persons connected by a common origin” 
and maintains that the term “came to be used in the sense of type as designating species of men distinct both in physical 
constitution and mental capacities”; however, he insists that “the main issue is not what ‘race’ is but the way it is used” 
(2004, 333). On this basis, race has come to be viewed as a social construct rather than a natural (or biological) given, “a 
shifting signifier that means different things to different parties at different points in history [which] defies definitive explica-
tion outside specific contexts” (Van Den Berghe 2004, 334). At this point in the discussion, race should be understood as 
referring to a phenomenon that is historically-contemporaneous with, and genealogically related to, the practice of racism 
which may be understood, loosely, in terms of patterns of discrimination based on physical markers that reflect asymmetri-
cal relations of power and privilege, oppression, domination and exploitation. 
: “DEFINITION: a system of 
15 In academic sociology, the situation is somewhat different in that race (latterly ethnicity), along with class and gender, 
has been a focus of enquiry for a much longer period and has received a large amount of scholarly attention, both with 
respect to empirical studies and theoretical framings of the concept. Representative works in the sociological literature on 
race and racism include Banton (1998), Miles and Brown (2003) and Rattansi (2007). 
16 It is crucial to appreciate that I am using the phrase “critical race-theoretical” in a somewhat different sense to how 
this term is generally understood. In its original formulation, Critical Race Theory (CRT) is an academic discipline examining 
issues at the intersection of race, law and power. According to Nakamura and Chow-White, CRT “investigates the shifting 
meanings of race and how it works in society, and proposes interventions in the name of social justice” (2001b, 5). 
17 See Compaine (2001), Moss (2002), Warschauer (2003) and Hargittai (2008) for examples of such studies. 
18 In this connection, see Kolko et al. (2000), Nakamura (2002; 2007) and Nakamura and Chow-White (2011a). 
19 Works of this type include Back (2002) and Daniels (2009). 
20 Key works include Eglash (1995) and Eglash and Bleecker (2001) among others. 
21 One (partial) exception in this regard is the seminal essay “Encoding and Decoding in the Media Discourse” by cul-
tural theorist and sociologist, Stuart Hall (1973); however, it is important to appreciate that this work draws on the semi-
otics of communication rather than information theory as such. 
22 Self-referential definitions are common within disciplines that embrace reflexivity. Consider, for example, Maturana 
and Varela’s concept of an autopoietic (or self-producing) system within second-order cybernetics: “An autopoietic machine 
is a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of production (transformation and destruction) of 
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thought, speech, and action, operated by people who classify themselves as ‘white’, and who use 
deceit, violence, and/or the threat of violence, to subjugate, use, and/or abuse people classified as 
‘non-white’, under conditions that promote the practice of falsehood, non-justice, and incorrectness, 
in one or more areas of activity, for the ultimate purpose of maintaining, expanding, and/or refining 
the practice of White Supremacy (Racism)” (1984, 301) 
According to Fuller Jr., racism, which on his view is identical to white supremacy, is a global 
system composed of nine major areas of activity or subsystems, viz. economics, education, enter-
tainment, labour, law, politics, religion, sex and war. This systems-theoretical formulation is impor-
tant since it constitutes a contribution towards an information-theoretical framework for thinking 
about race that is also critically race-theoretical in orientation. In this regard, it represents a radical 
alternative to systemic frameworks based on the critical theoretical perspectives of thinkers such as 
Giddens, Bourdieu and Habermas, each of whom takes economics, politics and culture to be primi-
tive (or ‘core’) subsystems in a capitalist systemic whole. In addition, whereas critical theories of 
information as formulated by Lash (2002), Fuchs (2009) and others take capitalism to define the 
nature of the world system, Fuller Jr. considers that it is racism (or white supremacy) which as-
sumes this role. This is important since a critical perspective on information based on a critical race 
theory of this kind presents the possibility of a fundamentally different type of critique. 
3. A Reflexive Hermeneutic Approach to Race and Information 
In order to engage critically with issues at the intersection of race and information, one obvious 
approach might be to consider how critical enquiry associated with one field can be related to criti-
cal enquiry associated with the other. This would entail analyzing critical race theory from a critical 
information-theoretical perspective and analyzing critical information theory from a critical race-
theoretical perspective. Importantly, since neither theory can – or rather, should – be taken, a priori, 
as grounding23 relative to the other, the analyses would have to be understood as standing in re-
flexive (or circular) relation, resulting, thereby, in a hermeneutic (or interpretative) spiral of enquiry. 
In addition, it is important to recognize that critical race theory and critical information theory are not 
fields of enquiry whose terms of reference are universally agreed upon; on the contrary, what 
counts as critical race theory and what counts as critical information theory are, arguably, highly 
contestable, if not highly contested, issues, reflecting different agendas and, significantly, differen-
tial power relations among theoreticians24. Furthermore, the issue of contestation should be under-
stood to apply a fortiori to the concepts motivating both of these critical enquiries since, as is the 
case with so many terms of analysis, there are no universally agreed upon definitions or concepts 
of race and information25
Given the adoption of a reflexive hermeneutic approach, what this means is that analysis of 
race from a critical information-theoretical perspective and analysis of information from a critical 
race-theoretical perspective must proceed by selecting an exemplary formulation of each concept 
which is then placed in the foreground so as to motivate enquiry on a concrete basis, while main-




                                                                                                                                                                
components which: (i) through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of 
processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in space in which they (the 
components) exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a network” (1980, 78). 
. While any such selection might be viewed as somewhat arbitrary (or subjective) at 
the start of enquiry, the rationale for selection needs to be established and made transparent none-
theless. To this end, and given the provisional nature of this study, the concept of information for-
mulated by cyberneticist Gregory Bateson and the concept of race formulated by political philoso-
pher Charles W Mills will be placed in the analytical foreground. The rationale for selecting these 
particular formulations of information and race is that both can be shown to have a connection to 
23 Here, the term ‘ground’ is taken to refer either to a base (or foundation) or, alternatively, to a cause (or determinant). 
24 Mills (1997; 2003) points out that mainstream academic philosophy is overwhelmingly ‘white’, both with respect to the 
selection of works that are taught and made the subject of scholarly research activity, and also with regard to the composi-
tion of faculties at academic institutions. I maintain that the situation within critical race theory and critical information theory 
is similar, the former being dominated by discourses about ‘whiteness’ and ‘white privilege’, and the latter by a shared com-
mitment to some variant of Marxism as evidenced by Lash (2002) and Fuchs (2009). 
25 Following Hofkirchner (2011a), it might be argued that this is true for information because a science of information 
based on some form of hierarchical and unified theory of information (UTI) has yet to emerge; however, Floridi, who is 
committed to an approach based on a non-hierarchical “distributed network of connected concepts linked by mutual and 
dynamic influences that are not necessarily genetic or genealogical” which foregrounds “epistemically oriented semantic 
information” considers UTI to be, ultimately, both reductionist and “unlikely to succeed”. (2004a, 41) 
26 This approach is informed by a phenomenological perspective which, following Husserl, requires the analyst to go 
“back to things themselves” and treat concepts as phenomena; however, no commitment to a specific phenomenological 
orientation, irrespective of whether this is Husserlian, Heideggerian or something else, is entailed thereby. 
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the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant, thereby motivating their foregrounding as intersecting 
subjects (objects, topics, phenomena) of enquiry on critical reflexive hermeneutic grounds27
4. Race: A Critical Information-Theoretical Perspective 
. 
According to Capurro (2009), the term information, at least in its original Greek-Latin and Me-
dieval usage, originally had two meanings: (i) an objective meaning (“giving form to something”) 
and (ii) a communicational meaning (“telling something new”). Consistent with this position, von 
Bayer (2003) maintains that information should be understood as both inform-ation and in-
formation, that is, as involving both the transmission of meaning and the transfer of form (arrange-
ment, configuration, order, organisation, pattern, shape, structure and relationship). Crucially, on 
his view, “the meaning of a message arises out of the relationship of the individual symbols that 
make it up” (Bayer 2003, 19). 
Irrespective of whether or not certain types of patterns (forms, structures) – and hence, informa-
tion – can be taken to exist, and certain transformations of patterns by other patterns can be said to 
occur, in the non-human sphere independently of human consciousness28, Floridi (2004a) has 
shown that it is quite possible for information to exist in the human sphere in the absence of an 
informed subject even if an informer is necessary for the production of such information in the first 
instance. This is significant because the ontological status of certain patterns in the human world – 
for example, patterns of discrimination (prejudice) and/or domination (power) associated with racial 
difference – are generally taken to be both socially-constructed and causal (that is, they “make a 
difference” or have “effects”)29
4.1. Race as a system 
, yet it is unclear whether such patterns exist independently of con-
sciousness. Some philosophers of race, such as Garcia (1996), maintain that racism should be 
understood in individualistic terms and as fundamentally moral, attitudinal, intentional and volitional 
in nature; others, such as Shelby (2002), argue that race is essentially cognitive in nature, and that 
racist beliefs provide necessary and sufficient conditions for racism. However, all such accounts, 
irrespective of whether framed in terms which refer to the “heart” (morality) or those that refer to the 
“head” (beliefs), make consciousness a necessary condition for racism. 
While sympathetic to cognitive accounts of racism, Mills (1997; 1998; 2003; 2005; 2007) insists 
that racism can – and does – exist in a purely structural (or pattern-based) capacity, that is, in 
terms of differentially-embedded power relations that are at least not explicitly intentional, that is, 
dependent on consciousness for their continued existence. Put another way, racism can exist in 
the absence of informed subjects who are conscious of their racist beliefs and practices, although 
subjects who are conscious of their racist beliefs and practices – racist informers – are necessary 
for the production of racism in the first instance. This is possible because Mills maintains that pat-
terns of discrimination and/or domination associated with racial difference – that is, racism – should 
not be understood as the exceptional behaviour of individuals deviating from a non-racist social 
norm, but rather, as a global socio-political system30
                                                     
27 Shannon’s concept of information might have been selected on account of its widespread appeal and impact on phi-
losophical analysis. However, it has been rejected here on the grounds that, as stated previously, the concept is generally 
understood to be quantitative and syntactic in nature, being concerned with the codification and transmission of messages 
and signals. Nonetheless, to the extent that racialization, which may be taken to refer to “any process or situation wherein 
the meaning of ‘race’ is introduced to define and given meaning to some particular population, its characteristics and ac-
tions” (Miles 2004, 348), necessarily involves racial coding (or codification), that is “a process through which people, objects 
and events are understood, communicated and given meaning” (Malik 2004, 341), Shannon’s concept of information might, 
in fact, be highly relevant for critical information theoretical enquiry into the nature of race, albeit in the context of analysing 
race and racism with respect to how they are communicated. 
 that is both historical and material in nature. 
On Mills’ view, racism – more precisely, global white supremacy – is a political system, a particular 
power structure of formal or informal rule, socioeconomic privilege, and norms for the differential 
distribution of material wealth and opportunities, benefits and burdens, rights and duties. Crucially, 
Mills maintains that white supremacy can be theorised as a “contract” between whites – a Racial 
Contract – which he proceeds to define as follows: The Racial Contract is that set of formal or in-
formal agreements or meta-agreements (higher-level contracts about contracts, which set the limits 
28 This metaphysical thesis might be described as information realism. 
29 An exclusively epistemological interpretation of Bateson’s formulation of information (or rather its basic unit) such as 
the one proposed by Floridi, viz. “a ‘difference’ is just a discrete state (that is, a datum), and ‘making a difference’ simply 
means that the datum is ‘meaningful’, at least potentially” (2004a, 44-45), is, therefore, rejected. 
30 Race and racism are increasingly being interpreted as systemic phenomena and various accounts have been given of 
the historical origins and contemporary nature of the modern racial world system including those by Winant (2001; 2004) 
and Goldberg (2002). 
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of the contract’s validity) between the members of one subset of humans, henceforth designated by 
(shifting) “racial” (phenotypical/genealogical/cultural) criteria C1, C2, C3... as “white”, and coexten-
sive (making due allowance for gender differentiation) with the class of full persons, to categorise 
the remaining subset of humans as “nonwhite” and of a different and inferior moral status, subper-
sons, so that they have a subordinate civil standing in the white or white-ruled polities the whites 
either already inhabit or establish or in transactions as aliens with these polities, and the moral and 
juridical rules normally regulating the behaviour of whites in their dealing with one another either do 
not apply at all in dealings with nonwhites or apply only in a qualified form (depending in part on 
changing historical circumstances and what particular variety of nonwhite is involved), but in any 
case the general purpose of the Contract is always the differential privileging of the whites as a 
group with respect to the nonwhites as a group, the exploitation of their bodies, land, and re-
sources, and the denial of equal socioeconomic opportunities to them. All whites are beneficiaries 
of the Contract, though some whites are not signatories” (Mills 1997, 11). 
Analogous to Floridi’s hint that informers (or informing subjects) are necessary for the produc-
tion of information, whereas informed subjects are merely contingent, Mills maintains that con-
sciousness was necessary at the time of “signing” the Racial Contract in that, to paraphrase Bate-
son, a “very limited number” of (racial) differences were intentionally selected by those responsible 
for establishing the modern racial world system; however, subsequent to its establishment (or pro-
duction), the system has been maintained by what Mills refers to as an “inverted epistemology, an 
epistemology of ignorance, a particular pattern of localised and global cognitive dysfunctions 
(which are psychologically and socially functional)” which involve “white misunderstanding, misrep-
resentation, evasion, and self-deception on matters related to race” (2004a, 18-19)31
To the extent that information is concerned with differences that make a difference (Bateson 
1972) and involves a process of inform-ing – that is, transmission of meaning (von Bayer 2003) – 
which can turn out to be a process of mis/disinform-ing, it might be argued that the ‘signing’ (estab-
lishment) and subsequent ‘re-signing’ (maintenance, expansion and refinement) of the Racial Con-
tract of white supremacy constitute informational processes. 
. Such an 
epistemology results in the emergence of subjects whose behaviour and practices are systemically 
racist without being explicitly intentional, or, stated in terms of critical information theory, in the 
emergence of information – more precisely, an informational system (racism) – that can exist in the 
absence of informed subjects (conscious racists). 
4.2. Race as a process 
Notwithstanding the importance of systemic accounts of race and racism, Hesse argues that 
critical race theoretical perspectives such as the contractualist position articulated by Mills tend to 
involve “a residual empiricist reliance on the reduction of race in analysis to visible, corporeal dif-
ference” (2007, 645), that is, physical characteristics or “markers” such as colour located on the 
human body. According to Hesse, rather than being necessarily correlated with the presence (or 
absence) of material markers on the body, “racialization [is] embodied in a series of onto-colonial 
taxonomies of land, climate, history, bodies, customs, language, all of which became sedimented 
metonymically, metaphorically, and normatively, as the assembled attributions of race” (2007, 658-
659). In short, while embodiment, in the broad sense of materiality (or physicality), is a necessary 
condition for race, such embodiment can assume – and, historically, has assumed – different forms 
including those that are religious, ‘scientific’ and cultural (Blaut 1992). To paraphrase the cultural 
theorist and sociologist Stuart Hall, it might be said that “race is a shape-shifting signifier”32
                                                     
31 According to Mills (1997), the Racial Contract (i) prescribes norms for cognition, (ii) motivates the selection of facts; 
and (iii) determines what counts as information. 
. To the 
extent that information is concerned with differences that make a difference and involves a process 
of in-forming or transfer of form (von Bayer 2003) – that is, implanting form or, alternatively, allow-
ing form to become sedimented – it might be argued that the “series of taxonomies” (or successive 
systems of hierarchical classification associated with the process of racial formation, i.e. racializa-
tion) constitutes an informational process. This position derives support from Bateson’s assertion 
that “there are differences between differences. Every effective difference denotes a demarcation, 
a line of classification, and all classification is hierarchic. In other words, differences are themselves 
to be differentiated and classified” (1972, 324) 
32 Hall (2002) describes race as a “floating signifier”. From the perspective of the reflexive hermeneutic approach to race 
and information presented herein, comparing and contrasting Hall’s formulation with the Lacan-inspired notion of information 
as a “flickering signifier” presented by Hayles (1999) constitutes a hermeneutic enquiry that is both interesting and relevant. 
tripleC 11(1): 93-106, 2013 101 
CC: Creative Commons License, 2013. 
5. Information: A Critical Race-Theoretical Perspective 
In the course of clarifying what is meant by the philosophy of information (PI), Floridi makes the 
following interesting statement33
Consistent with this position, in what follows, one seminal conceptualisation of information that 
is a historical (or diachronic) antecedent of PI will be subjected to hermeneutic enquiry from a criti-
cal race theoretical perspective. 
: “An excessive concern with the metatheoretical aspects of PI may 
lead one to miss the important fact that it is perfectly legitimate to speak of PI even in authors who 
lived centuries before the information revolution. Hence, it will be extremely fruitful to develop a 
historical approach and trace PI’s diachronic evolution, so long as the technical and conceptual 
frameworks of ICS are not anachronistically applied but are used to provide the conceptual method 
and privileged perspective to evaluate in full the reflections that were developed on the nature, 
dynamics, and utilisation of information before the digital revolution” (2002, 138-139). 
5.1. Bateson, Kant and Race 
In Steps to An Ecology of Mind (1972), Gregory Bateson maintains that information, or rather, 
the elementary unit of information, is “a difference that makes a difference” (1972, 459). Crucially, 
in framing his concept of the basic unit of information, Bateson makes reference to Kant’s asser-
tions, in the Critique of Judgement, that the most elementary aesthetic act is the selection of a fact, 
and that there are an infinite number of potential facts associated with a thing. On this basis, Bate-
son is led to assert that there are an infinite number of differences associated with a thing, and that 
information for someone (or something) refers to a “very limited number” (1972, 459) of such differ-
ences selected from this infinite set. The differences that are selected make a difference to some-
one (or something) in that they are regarded as significant in some context; hence, Bateson’s con-
cept of information is fundamentally both contextual and causal in nature – a fact that can be 
shown to have widespread and profound implications for its application in the social world. 
The influence of Kantian epistemology – more specifically, Kant’s views on how facts are se-
lected – on Bateson (and Floridi, Capurro, Hofkirchner and others) may be significant in more than 
one regard. This is because in addition to being one of the most important metaphysical, moral and 
political philosophers of the modern period, Kant, as lecturer in anthropology and physical geogra-
phy, is also responsible for originating the modern ‘scientific’ concept of race and was, himself, a 
racist (Eze 1997; Bernasconi 2001b; 2003a; 2011; Larrimore 1999; 2008)34
In his defence, Kantians such as Louden (2000) and Hill Jr. and Boxill (2001) have attempted to 
show that Kant’s racism, while regrettable, is merely empirical and that it has a peripheral status 
which does not impact significantly on the rational core of his philosophy; others such as Kleingeld 
(2007) have argued that Kant gradually abandoned racism in favour of a cosmopolitan perspective 
during the course of developing his critical philosophical project. Unfortunately for Kant’s defend-
ers, however, Larrimore (2008) and Bernasconi (2011) have demonstrated, quite convincingly, that 
Kant’s cosmopolitanism can be reconciled with his racism, and that there is no indication that he 
abandoned a commitment to racism at any point in his philosophical career. Furthermore, and 
more importantly in the context of the present discussion, the extent to which Kant’s racism may, in 
fact, impact on his overall philosophical project, including his epistemology, cannot be said to a 
settled matter. 
. 
For this reason, it is legitimate, perhaps even necessary, to investigate the extent to which Kant-
ian epistemology is racialized and, as a corollary, to what extent, if at all, the concept of informa-
tion, at least as formulated by Bateson, is also racialized from a critical theory perspective. Both 
Bateson’s concept of information, and Kant’s concept of aesthetic judgement which inspired it, are 
fundamentally teleological (or goal-oriented) in that they appeal to selection which is a purposeful 
act; however, whereas Kant’s teleology can readily be shown to be grounded in a racist anthropol-
ogy, the situation is, arguably, somewhat less clear in the case of Bateson. 
For example, Bateson’s defenders might point to the distinction he makes between what he 
calls “Occidental Epistemology” (or OE) and cybernetic epistemology (CE), in Bateson (1972), and 
argue that Kant’s epistemology is an instance of the former. However, this move is problematic on 
a number of counts. Firstly, Bateson nowhere explores the connections between Kant, epistemol-
ogy, race and information, nor does he explicitly identify Kant’s epistemology as an instance of OE; 
                                                     
33 This statement is significant since Floridi, along with other contemporary philosophers and systems theorists such as 
Capurro and Hofkirchner, makes reference to the thinking of a number of major thinkers within the Western philosophical 
tradition including Descartes, Kant and Hegel. 
34 According to Eze (1997), Kant lectured more on anthropology and physical geography than on moral philosophy, and 
was responsible for introducing these subjects into German universities based on his own research. 
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secondly, Kantian epistemology is often appealed to in formulating cybernetic conceptions of know-
ing, which means that identifying it as an instance of OE is, at a minimum, a questionable move; 
thirdly, Bateson’s distinction between OE and CE is itself contestable. If Heidegger (1977) is cor-
rect that the essence of the (post-)modern epoch may be identified with what he refers to as “cy-
bernetic totalism” and that this is the destiny of ‘The West’ (that is, the Occident), it would seem to 
follow that contrary to Bateson, CE, rather than standing in opposition to OE, is, in fact, its next 
historical phase35. Similar to the way that Larrimore (2008) has shown Kant to posit the white race 
as both a race among races and yet transcending race (to whiteness), it might be argued that “cy-
bernetic totalism” – perhaps even cybernetics per se – is a kind of post-humanism that both tran-
scends and yet remains essentially grounded in the Western Enlightenment humanist project. With 
respect to Bateson’s epistemology, this would mean that CE is both OE and post-OE. On this ba-
sis, it becomes necessary to enquire as to whether – or rather, to what extent – mainstream (or 
dominant) conceptions of cybernetics, systems theory and information theory, even in their ‘critical’ 
forms, are yet further instances of the Occidental/Western – which here means white/Eurocentric – 
particular presenting itself, that is, masquerading, as the universal? 36
According to Heims, “cybernetic ideas can be applied in the most diverse ideological contexts” 
(1993, 180). For example, cybernetic formulations have been used to justify both centralizations 
and decentralizations of power, to reconcile decentralized control with centralized purpose (under 
Soviet Communism), and to articulate functional analyses of the status quo (under American capi-
talism). However, despite their ideological diversity, such applications remain Eurocentric, both in 
terms of their point of origin and in terms of their expansive/totalizing scope. In this sense, cyber-
netics is fundamentally Eurocentric and hence, arguably white supremacist in nature, notwithstand-
ing the allegedly ‘abstract’ structural-functional terms within which it is articulated
 
37
In light of the above, it becomes legitimate – perhaps necessary – to enquire as to whether 
Bateson was simply being naïve in basing his concept of information on Kantian foundations or, 
following Mills (1997; 2007), whether, as a white beneficiary within a system of global white su-
premacy, he was blinded to consideration of such concerns by an “epistemology of ignorance”. 
. On this view, 
cybernetics and informatics should be considered racial formations and the allegedly ‘abstract’ and 
impartial/neutral stance associated with them should be understood as masking the operation of 
racism or white supremacy. This entails considering “information” and the thinking that views itself 
as proper to it from a critical race theoretical perspective as historical formations that have been 
and still are complicit in the perpetration and perpetuation of various historical injustices. 
5.2. Race and Epistemology 
In formulating his General Definition of Information (GDI) as data + meaning, i.e. objective se-
mantic content composed of a collection of data that are well-formed and meaningful, Floridi pro-
ceeds to define a datum as a “lack of uniformity between two signs”. On his view, “a datum is a 
relational entity” and its definition “leaves underdetermined not only the logical type to which the 
relata belong, but also the classification of the relata” (2004a, 43). Floridi further maintains that “a 
datum is usually classified as the entity exhibiting the anomaly, often because the latter is percep-
tually more conspicuous or less redundant than the background conditions” (2004a, 43, emphasis 
added). From a critical race theoretical perspective, the idea of perceptual conspicuousness is 
significant since Brubaker et al. (2004), along with others, have shown that perception is condi-
tioned by conceptual categories and classifications that are socially-informed which means that 
what and how things are perceived will, to some extent, reflect the power relations existing in a 
given society. According to Mills (2007), it is this fact of social cognition (conception, perception) 
that helps to explain what was previously described as an “epistemology of ignorance” under condi-
tions of systemic racism or white supremacy. As to the matter of classification, it is interesting to 
note, again, that according to Bateson, “there are differences between differences. Every effective 
difference denotes a demarcation, a line of classification, and all classification is hierarchic. In other 
words, differences are themselves to be differentiated and classified” (1972, 324). 
                                                     
35 Lanier (2000) insists that a distinction must be made between cybernetics and cybernetic totalism; however, from a 
critical race theoretical perspective, it is at least conceivable that this distinction may turn out to be analogous to the distinc-
tion between refined/covert (invisible) and crude/overt (visible) forms of racism. 
36 As Johar Schueller states, “the colonizers speak for all humanity and the colonized simply talk about their own condi-
tion. The universalizing impulse implicitly draws on the legacy of colonialism and the project of modernity, albeit in a global-
ized, postcolonial world” (2005, 64). The tendency to conflate the Eurocentric particular with the universal is explored in 
Wallerstein (2005) among other works. 
37 It must be recognised, however, that some postcolonial – or rather, decolonial – theorists such as Mignolo consider 
that certain strands of second-order (or reflexive) cybernetic thinking, such as the theory of autopoiesis proposed by 
Maturana and Varela, may possess a liberating potential vis-à-vis the project of epistemic decolonisation. 
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This leads to consideration of yet another important issue, viz. the difference – or perhaps that 
should be distinction - between the terms difference and distinction38
Building on Bateson’s Kant-inspired reference to the infinity of differences associated with a 
thing, Wilden maintains that “we recognize that there are no ‘facts’ in science, only an infinity of 
possible differences (and types of difference) among which to choose to make DISTINCTIONS, 
and that our choice to transform or translate a particular difference into a distinction cannot be con-
strained by our ‘hypotheses’, both individual and collective ... ALL KNOWLEDGE IS INSTRUMEN-
TAL. In the terms of modern communications theory, information (coded variety) is everywhere, but 
knowledge can only occur within the ecosystemic context of a goal-seeking adaptive system peo-
pled by goal-seeking subsystems. If this is the case, then we are required to ask how the knowl-
edge has been coded and filtered; and what it is being used for, and for whom” (1972, xxix). 
. On one conception, differ-
ences can be taken as given (or natural), whereas distinctions are held to be made (or con-
structed). This formulation is useful since it points to a social origin for the semantics of distinction 
that resonates strongly with ordinary (or folk) usage of the term as indicating a difference of status 
or position as in, for example, expressions such as “a person of distinction”. Delving deeper, such a 
conception functions to motivate consideration of who it is within society that is responsible for 
making (or constructing) distinctions – that is, which individuals and groups – leading to an analysis 
of socio-political stakeholders and the asymmetric power relations that exist among them. 
In addition to the shift in focus from difference to distinction and from information to knowledge, 
mention of “our choice” in the above quote is significant since it implies a historical contingency and 
volitional component in the construction of distinctions, as well as the necessary existence of a 
group responsible for such constructions. However, the characteristics of this group – specifically, 
its racial composition – remains unstated, thereby giving the unwarranted impression that it is com-
posed of all kinds of people, each of whom stands on an equal footing; power relations – or rather, 
power differentials – remain both masked and unexplored. Nonetheless, Wilden’s conception of a 
teleological (that is, purposeful or goal-seeking) ecosystem peopled by teleological subsystems is 
important since it links distinction and difference to human systemic concerns, which from a critical 
race theoretical perspective means linking to systemic formulations of race as white supremacy 
presented by Fuller Jr., Mills and others. 
5.3. Information, Embodiment and Race 
One explanation for the lack of engagement with information theory from a critical race theoreti-
cal perspective lies in the widespread tendency to view information as necessarily abstract and 
disembodied. For example, as previously stated, Bateson (1972) held that the elementary unit of 
information is “a difference that makes a difference” and that this difference is an “abstract matter” 
(p.458, emphasis added). However, Hayles (1999) contests this view, arguing that information was 
originally concrete and embodied, and that it gradually lost its ‘body’ as a consequence of a shift 
from a worldview that prioritised presence (or materiality) to one that prioritises pattern (or form) 39
Mills’ (1997) historically-informed methodological hypothesis about the “epistemology of igno-
rance” as involving the construction of cognitively dysfunctional (yet socio-politically functional) 
“colour-blind” categories and classifications following the “signing” of the “Racial Contract” is rele-
vant for understanding how, but perhaps more importantly why, information became disembodied. 
Conversely, the significance of moves to re-embody information – for example, in theories of em-
bodied cognition, at least some of which have Kantian foundations – in terms of a “re-writing” of the 
“Racial Contract” needs to be considered since the body invoked in such theories is tacitly as-
sumed to be race-less, much in the same way that mainstream social contract theory is based on 
the presumption of a de-raced ‘person’ as ontologically primitive. 
. 
From the perspective of critical race theory, the loss of information’s ‘body’ is significant since it 
involves an overt shift from the concrete and embodied to the abstract and disembodied which 
masks a covert shift from the particular and raced to the (allegedly) universal and race-less (or de-
raced). To the extent that racialization can be viewed as an informational – that is, in-formational – 
process, information’s loss of body can be understood as a process of overt (or visible) de-
racialization that masks a process of covert (or invisible) re-racialization. 
Finally, the significance of race, racism and processes of racialization for thinking about the re-
lation between information and embodiment, and the relevance of this for yet further “re-writing” of 
the “Racial Contract”, also re-surfaces in the context of debates about identity, the socio-political 
                                                     
38 In addition, there is a need to consider how difference and distinction relate to Derrida’s concept of différance with its 
dual connotations of displacement and deferral in connection with signifiers and processes of signification (Wilden 1972). 
39 This shift was engendered by the emergence of cybernetic and computational conceptions of phenomena. 
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logic of biometric technologies (Pugliese 2005, 2007; Browne 2009), and the new conceptions of 
race engendered by the HapMap Project’s search for genetic differences between ‘racial’ groups. 
The latter development is particularly disturbing since it appears to mark a shift back to biological 
conceptions of race through ‘informationalization’ of the latter40
6. Conclusion 
. According to Chow-White, “the 
convergence of changing concepts of race with information technologies has produced a new 
paradigm for race – what I refer to as the informationalization of race. This paradigm, while it 
emerges in discourses of the information age that present themselves as color-blind, is, I argue, in 
fact, a product of new regimes of racial knowledge that are oriented around the digital cultures of 
communication technologies, especially the Internet and databases, both in everyday practices and 
social institutions” (2008, 1169-1170). 
This paper has attempted to explore issues at the intersection of race and information by adopt-
ing a reflexive hermeneutic approach involving the analysis of race from a critical information theo-
retical perspective, while analyzing information from a critical race theoretical perspective. It has 
been shown that systemic conceptions of race and racism are readily interpreted in terms of infor-
mation theoretical concepts and processes, but that racial concepts and processes may be em-
bedded within information theory, including critical information theory. However, further studies 
which make use of the reflexive hermeneutic approach presented herein need to be carried out in 
order to substantiate these claims more fully. 
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